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This is an old revision of this page, as edited by Radiant! (talk | contribs) at 14:26, 1 November 2009 (→‎Public v. Secret Voting: +1). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

An RfC was held a few months ago to decide whether to hold a secret ballot in this year's ArbCom elections. The result was an overwhelming yes, with support also being expressed for implementing a Schulze method of electing arbitrators. See Wikipedia:Requests for comment/ArbCom secret ballot.

Back in 2008, there was a strong consensus for a reduction in the duration of arbitrator terms. This can be seen in the 2008 RFC about the Arbitration Committee, where the opinion with the second highest support was SirFozzie's "reduce ArbCom terms" view. A lot of water has gone under the bridge since then, and term lengths were not changed for the 2008 election.

The question of the number of arbitrator seats, and the length of their terms, is again being raised on Jimbo's talk page, and now on the 2009 election talk page. Typically Jimbo has made decisions about these matters after the election, however this year has seen a significant increase in the community wanting a say in these governance decisions. (e.g. User:Giano/The future followed by User:Giano/Findings of "The Future")

If the community is going to decide, or provide Jimbo with a loud signal, we need to do so now. We do not need to come up with a system that will be future proof. We can have another RFC next year to cater to the different needs of the next election.

Poll

This is a poll to gather consensus on how the community feels about the number of arbitrators, the length of their term, and the method by which they are chosen.

Please keep comments to a minimum in the poll sections. Long-form discussion should take place on the talk page, and exchanges which veer off the topic will also be transferred to the talk page.

Please place your views and proposals below the poll.

Sign multiple options if more than one is desirable to you.

Term lengths

One year

  1. Everyking (talk) 07:17, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. Hipocrite (talk) 14:06, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. Majorly talk 17:55, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. Per my comments below. Offliner (talk) 22:29, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5.  – iridescent 22:42, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. MoreThings (talk) 00:42, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  7. Less is more. -Atmoz (talk) 02:05, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  8. I understand the arguments that a year is too short, but I would nevertheless prefer to see a quick turnaround. SlimVirgin talk|contribs 20:45, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

18 months

  1. John Vandenberg (chat) 09:15, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2.  Skomorokh, barbarian  10:15, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. ~ Amory (u • t • c) 16:39, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. Tactical voting because 2 years is two long and 1 year is optimal but 1 year is unlikey to have support. Hipocrite (talk) 14:14, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. I also think two years would be better than three, but 18 months allows us to continue to easily stagger 3 tranches of arbitrators with elections falling at the same time of year.--chaser (talk) 06:55, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. second choice (first choice is two years) Sssoul (talk) 09:25, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Two years

  1. John Vandenberg (chat) 09:15, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2.  Skomorokh, barbarian  10:15, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. SoWhy 12:42, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. Mr.Z-man 14:47, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. ~ Amory (u • t • c) 16:39, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. Karanacs (talk) 16:52, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  7. Davewild (talk) 18:44, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  8. Manning (talk) 06:36, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  9. rspεεr (talk) 07:44, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  10. Keegan Three years is too long, one year is getting your feet wet. This is particularly important because active cases may come up again in year's time. Keegan (talk) 07:46, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  11. Moreschi (talk) 09:01, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  12. Sjakkalle (Check!) 09:44, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  13. Understanding that some sitting Arbs might consider running again for a second term, which should be encouraged (as long as they were effective previously). LessHeard vanU (talk) 14:04, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  14.  Sandstein  14:24, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  15. --Dirk Beetstra T C 15:19, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  16. Three years has obviously been too long, and 18 months introduces too many issues relative to election cycles. Nathan T 15:22, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  17. MBisanz talk 16:08, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  18. For clarity and stability. —Finn Casey * * * 17:06, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  19. JoshuaZ (talk) 17:36, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  20. Two years seems like a good period of time. Basket of Puppies 17:37, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  21. NW (Talk) 17:43, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  22. — Ched :  ?  17:52, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  23. - Mjroots (talk) 18:38, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  24. --Elonka 18:47, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  25. —NMajdan•talk 19:31, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  26. Durova349 19:54, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  27. Cirt (talk) 20:12, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  28. John Carter (talk) 20:38, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  29. Jayron32 20:42, 30 October 2009 (UTC) Two is good for continuity. It should be noted that this more closely reflects current practice anyways; few arbitrators actually complete their 3 year term anyways.[reply]
  30. Almost no-one wants to go on for three years, partly because it's a high stress position, mostly because it tends to take up all the time on wikipedia. However, 18 months is too short to get continuity and experience which the committee needs. Sam Blacketer (talk) 20:51, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  31. Very few people have in practice served effectively for longer than two years. Continuity is good, but this is the longest length that is realistic. . DGG ( talk ) 21:11, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  32. — Jake Wartenberg 21:20, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  33. Experience shows that three-year terms just don't work, for the reasons stated by Sam, DGG and others. Short Brigade Harvester Boris (talk) 22:14, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  34. One year is too short, three is too long, and I don't like the idea of having switchouts every half-year. ThemFromSpace 22:20, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  35.  M2Ys4U (talk) 22:42, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  36. Even number. One and a half years would be harder to implement.   Will Beback  talk  23:27, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  37. the wub "?!" 00:45, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  38. Second choice. I prefer staying with 3 year terms. But two year terms is acceptable too. - jc37 02:02, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  39. First choice. Three years is punishingly long for an arb. One year seems too short given the need for accumulated experience and overlapping terms on the Committee. Two years is idea, IMO. Tony (talk) 05:32, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  40. This is best, in my view. Arbs who can do the role for longer should be seeking re-election after two years in any case, ideally with a break of a year. By the third year, they may no longer have the same support they had two years previously. Carcharoth (talk) 07:15, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  41. This is the number I've been supporting publicly and privately. — Coren (talk) 12:45, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  42. I'd also consider 18 months reasonable. Heimstern Läufer (talk) 13:16, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  43. FloNight♥♥♥♥ 14:14, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  44. Two years seems to be a fair length to balance community power over ArbCom membership and the need for terms to be long enough for new ArbCom members to get momentum and experience. Three year terms are also simply too long for a voluntary but heavily demanding job like being on this committee with few members ever completing their full terms. Camaron · Christopher · talk 19:56, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  45. Second choice. I would actually prefer one year; 18 months would be good too, but I can't see how that would fit with annual elections, and having elections more often than that would be a lot of extra work. SlimVirgin talk|contribs 20:45, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  46. Ironholds (talk) 22:22, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  47. NellieBly (talk) 22:31, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  48. Sensible length for arbs, and means that with resignations a majority of seats are up for election each year.--Scott Mac (Doc) 23:46, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  49. Three years is just too long. Master&Expert (Talk) 03:38, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  50. Few stick around the full three years, so shortening a bit is a wise idea.--chaser (talk) 06:55, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  51. --Cybercobra (talk) 08:40, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  52. first choice (18 months is second choice) Sssoul (talk) 09:23, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  53. --KrebMarkt 10:20, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  54. This would seem best; 3 years is definitely too long and generates burnout, but a year wouldn't be enough to get up momentum. Stifle (talk) 10:27, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  55. Mailer Diablo 10:56, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  56. 2 years is a really good number to serve on a board or a committee the 1st to get to know what you are doing and the 2nd to get things done. When there is a 3rd year the 3rd is sent thinking about how much fun you could be having doing something else... RP459 (talk) 13:24, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  57. Acceptable, slightly prefer 3 years but not by much. Casliber (talk · contribs) 13:47, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Three years

Note: This is the current maximum term length.
  1. But if arbs want to retire earlier thats fine too. Christopher Parham (talk) 18:40, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. I first proposed the two year term idea. Because we were seeing quite a bit of "arbitrator fatigue". However, After talking with others, including User:Jimbo Wales, I have changed my mind, and think that it should be three years. ALong with that, arbitrators should be free to resign whenever they wish. And short wikibreaks should also be freely allowed. I am wholly against 1 year terms. - jc37 13:39, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. Arbs are of course welcome to resign earlier, but three years seems reasonable if they want to stick it out. The election process is a time-consuming and distracting one, arbs shouldn't be required to go through it more often than is necessary. It's better to keep their attention on other things (such as cases). --Elonka 18:46, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. Arb elections are time-consuming, and it takes time for new arbs to come up to speed; I don't believe two-year terms will be helpful and in fact could penalize some of the more effective arbs. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 22:55, 30 October 2009 (UTC) A problem here, apparently my "vote" was lost in this edit; it's good thing I noticed, re-added, and I hope others are watching. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 01:04, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. A shorter term means more campaigning, less arbitrating. Chick Bowen 04:05, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. This is still acceptable, but two years is better. Carcharoth (talk) 07:15, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  7. Either 2 or 3 year terms is reasonable. FloNight♥♥♥♥ 14:17, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  8. It takes so long to get up to speed. Also, consider a 3 year term like a 2 year one with an option. Casliber (talk · contribs) 13:46, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Leave it adaptable to the current situation

As I remember after the last elections some arbitrators were appointed for 1 year terms, some for 2 years and remaining for 3 years. I think that the term length should remain flexible, so that User:Jimbo Wales can decide term lengths based upon the number of votes each candidate receives during elections and upon other circumstances. Ruslik_Zero 12:18, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Number of seats

12 seats

The Arbitration Committee had 12 seats from inception until the end of 2004.

Based on 10 arbitrators being appointed to serve into 2010, 12 seats would result in only 2 appointments in the upcoming election.

  1. Arbs are not the Apostles and Jimbo is definitely not Jesus, but the more arbs there are, the easier it is for each arb to avoid taking responsibility as an individual. Deacon of Pndapetzim (Talk) 20:18, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. Less is more. -Atmoz (talk) 02:05, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. Twelve or thirteen arbitrators would probably be an optimal number if we could count on everyone being able to participate. Of course, that's not always a fair assumption given real-life commitments that come up, etc. If we make this choice, we need to elect more than 2 arbitrators in this election, though, so we might have to transition back over time rather than all at once. In any event, it looks like the consensus is to stick with the larger committee. Newyorkbrad (talk) 21:45, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

15 seats

The Arbitration Committee had 15 seats between 2005 and the end of 2008.

Based on 10 arbitrators being appointed to serve into 2010, 15 seats would result in 5 appointments in the upcoming election.

  1.  Skomorokh, barbarian  10:15, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. Fifteen is a better number considering four to five arbitrators are inactive at any given time, and the council shouldn't be too large to convolute discussion and slow the process even more. Keegan (talk) 07:48, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. Probably the best model between sharing workload efficiently and not being too unwieldy as to hamper progress. LessHeard vanU (talk) 14:00, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. Preferable. MBisanz talk 17:44, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. See reasons on talk. Durova349 19:57, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. Larger numbers actually makes decision-making more difficult. Sam Blacketer (talk) 20:53, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  7. If we go to 2 years, 15 seats is enough, because fewer of the arbs will be inactive through burnout. But we might consider this one time having it 18 seats as a transition. DGG ( talk ) 21:13, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  8. — Jake Wartenberg 21:21, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  9. A good compromise. Larger numbers require reaching further down the list of candidates to those with less solid community support. Short Brigade Harvester Boris (talk) 22:12, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  10. Anything more and each arb doesn't get much of an individual say in the matter. Also, per the above. ThemFromSpace 22:19, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  11. Keegan, Sam Blacketer, and SBHB have it right. Fifteen positions should be ample with 2 year terms. Risker (talk) 00:03, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  12. Somewhere between 12 and 16 should be fine. And since this is between 12 and 16... Also, As a few others have said, I don't like the idea that arbitratorship is given out to those less-than-worthy simply to fill seats. - jc37 02:02, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  13. Second option, if 18 seats results in dipping into lower Support percentages. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 02:22, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  14. This is equally acceptable to the eighteen seat option. —Finn Casey * * * 02:35, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  15. Cirt (talk) 04:19, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  16. Second option. Needs to be an even number if you have two-year terms, or you have alternate number of seats up for election each year (8, then 7, then 8, then 7, etc). Carcharoth (talk) 07:20, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  17. Strongly prefer the Committee is scaled back to 12 to 15 people. A large part of the burn out comes from the difficulty in coordinating Committee work of more than a dozen people scattered all across the globe. Fewer is more in this situation. FloNight♥♥♥♥ 13:31, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  18. Per FloNight. Newyorkbrad (talk) 21:43, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  19. Agree that 15 is about right, as (given holidays and the like) it would give around 12 arbitrators available. NellieBly (talk) 22:34, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  20. Per the arbs commenting in this section, who must know best what it's like coordinating behind the scenes.--chaser (talk) 06:58, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  21. what chaser said. Sssoul (talk) 09:21, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  22. Slightly prefer 18 as it allows leeway for breaks etc. I did feel that larger numbers did impair some quick decision making too as per others above. Casliber (talk · contribs) 13:50, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

18 seats

The Arbitration Committee was expanded to 18 seats after the 2008 election, however it only consisted of 16 arbitrators for the first six months, and there are only 13 bums on seats at the moment.

Based on 10 arbitrators being appointed to serve into 2010, 18 would result in 8 appointments in the upcoming election.

  1. John Vandenberg (chat) 09:15, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2.  Skomorokh, barbarian  10:15, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. Considering the size of this community and the amount of necessary fluctuation that always happens with Arbitrators, a larger ArbCom is in the community's best interest (also to weaken "cabal!"-accusations and to allow to reflect on the diversity of users on this project). Regards SoWhy 12:45, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. More is generally better, but I think there should be some minimum support required in the election (if there isn't already) in case there aren't many candidates. I'd rather have a couple fewer than have some with too little trust. Mr.Z-man 14:50, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. ~ Amory (u • t • c) 16:39, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. with the same caveat as Mr. Z-Man. Karanacs (talk) 16:53, 29 October 2009 (UTC) Note: I think the minimum threshold should be 66% Karanacs (talk) 13:27, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  7. Davewild (talk) 18:45, 29 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  8. Manning (talk) 06:36, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  9. Everyking (talk) 07:17, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  10. With Z-man's caveat. rspεεr (talk) 07:44, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  11. Clearly the only sensible option with the Committe's current workload (which I believe is far too high, but). Moreschi (talk) 09:03, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  12. Sjakkalle (Check!) 09:44, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  13. To allow for inacitvity, etc., and task delegation.  Sandstein  14:26, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  14. Allow for inactivity, recusals, could this be combined with a minimum number of active arbs (e.g. 9?), and that the active Arbs on a case are decided on before the case opens (no additions during the case, except with clear and transparent notice which and why an arb is being added when the number would drop below the minimum)? --Dirk Beetstra T C 15:23, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  15. Because otherwise by the end of the first year we'd have no arbs. I've asked the committee on perhaps 5 or 6 separate occasions to follow through on Jimbo's request for the development of a procedure to replace inactive arbitrators. As the committee has never addressed this publicly in any way, we obviously cannot have a committee so small that attrition renders it completely ineffective between elections. Nathan T 15:26, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  16. Probably easiest. —Finn Casey * * * 17:07, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  17. With consideration of gauging consensus for reserving one or more seats for non-admin editors. Basket of Puppies 17:38, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  18. NW (Talk) 17:43, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  19. Only 18 seats? I would have thought that number was on the low side. Mjroots (talk) 18:44, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  20. I'd support a larger Committee, but perhaps not require all of them to weigh in on every case. For example, a maximum of 9-10 active arbs reviewing any particular case would seem sufficient. --Elonka 18:50, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  21. SPLETTE :] How's my driving? 19:33, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  22. John Carter (talk) 20:40, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  23. --Jayron32 21:06, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  24. Offliner (talk) 22:29, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  25. Agree with Z-man; expand the committee only if that doesn't mean dipping too low into Support percentages. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 22:57, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  26. The comittee has so many responsibilities that more hands would be beneficial. It might also be worthwhile to create an "alternates" list made up of those who've gained sufficient support but aren't needed immediately to fill the committee.   Will Beback  talk  23:30, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  27. the wub "?!" 00:42, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  28. There are three compelling reasons to stick to Jimbo's intuition that 18, an historic increase in seats, is now appropriate: (1) Arb. burn-out is a concern, and we would do well to make it normal, unremarkable, for arbs to take scheduled refresher breaks. (2) The trend is towards greater delegation and arb involvement in specific roles such as serving on subcommittees. Giving the Committee the flexibility to temporarily re-allocate members to tasks other than formal hearings will serve the project well. (3) If we go to two-year terms, as seems likely, 18 maximises the overlap of terms, which is good for internal mentoring and the transfer of skills and knowledge. Tony (talk) 05:46, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  29. This option is best because it allows further streamlining and delegation, as John has pointed out. Carcharoth (talk) 07:20, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  30. Having a little slack at the beginning of the year, while sometimes a little suboptimal, gives better odds that the committee can keep up with the workload all the way to the end of the year in case of inactivity or attrition. — Coren (talk) 12:46, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  31. Given the heavy workload of the committee 18 members seems appropriate. A larger committee will also more accurately reflect the diversity of the community, plus absorb burnouts and resignations. It should also ideally be an even number if two year terms are implemented i.e. 12, 14, 16, or 18 members. Camaron · Christopher · talk 20:07, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  32. More Arbs is good from the workload point of view, but also because the larger the number, the greater diversity of views, and the less inward-looking. SlimVirgin talk|contribs 20:47, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  33. More arbs is good. The Law situation demonstrated that we don't even have enough arbs to handle casework and email, and some comments from Durova indicate that other mailing list comments have gone similarly unanswered for long periods of time. If I could, I'd up the number. Ironholds (talk) 22:23, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  34. ArbCom is obviously a stressful job that involves a great deal of work, reading through tons of emails and analyzing full pages of evidence; and often it seems as though very few appreciate all the Arbs are doing for us. Because it involves having numerous things to focus on at once, having more committee members will ideally allow them to go through things faster, and were one member to burn out, they could still continue on and compensate for whatever break he or she may go on. Master&Expert (Talk) 03:29, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  35. Distributes the workload more and ensures quorum when several arbs need to recuse themselves. --Cybercobra (talk) 08:42, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  36. Best option. --KrebMarkt 10:27, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  37. Given that the number of active arbs is 10 at the moment, I tend towards this one. Stifle (talk) 10:28, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  38. Needs more people to share the workload. Mailer Diablo 10:57, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  39. Support we need more hands t share the load... RP459 (talk) 13:22, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  40. I found this number was easier to spread workload around. Casliber (talk · contribs) 13:51, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Leave it adaptable to the current situation

Personally, I think that there are situations that come up, such as last year's elections, in which there were several who were REALLY close in votes. I think User:Jimbo Wales should be able to expand or contract the number of seats, based upon current events of the election, and current resignations, and so on. - jc37 13:39, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

This option does have merits. Flexibility is still present in the other options as well, though, mainly brought about by arbitrator resignation and departure. The question is who decides on the tweaks (Jimbo?) and when (before or after the election?). Carcharoth (talk) 07:20, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Per Carcharoth. Newyorkbrad (talk) 21:40, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  1. There is no need to have a fixed number of arbitrators. Any system with a fixed number will be too rigid and incapable of adaptation to changing circumstances. Ruslik_Zero 12:12, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. Receptive to this - ultimately there is no "correct" number, and is good in situations of close votespread such as last years' election. Casliber (talk · contribs) 13:52, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Election method

For a list of options, see {{electoral systems}}.

Approval voting (Support/Oppose)

Approval voting is the method used in the December 2008 elections, and in previous years, by which a voter may choose to support or oppose each candidacy, but is not required to enter a judgement about every candidacy (see example). Under the SecurePoll method, voters are required to enter judgements about every candidacy, but have the added option of being neutral (see example). The candidates are ranked by the ratio of supports to opposes.

  1. SecurePoll plus Support/Oppose is the best option. It's simple and familiar.  Roger Davies talk 13:10, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. Karanacs (talk) 13:26, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. The method must be intuitive and non-complex, and must be designed to elect multiple candidates. The Schulze method is specifically designed to elect a single candidate, and is also very complex and counter-intuitive. Cumulative voting is also very complex (allocating portions of one's vote to various candidates) and its main use is in corporate elections where the number of votes each elector has can vary widely. Complicated systems have a tendency to disenfranchise voters who simply want to voice their opinion on individual candidates and not have to do complex calculations to figure out what weight their votes should get. Risker (talk) 14:55, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. Simple = best. Also not at all sure that weighted voting methods promote the right sort of candidates for a consensus-driven community; specifically I mean that minority support, regardless of strength, should not cancel out broad opposition, while minority opposition, even if strong, should not cancel out broad support. Christopher Parham (talk) 15:30, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. Manning (talk) 15:36, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. Preferential voting requires that a voter research all candidates in detail. This makes it simpler, and also allows those with little time to research candidates to just vote for a few candidates. NW (Talk) 17:45, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  7. The support/oppose system works well. Though as I've indicated in another section of this RfC, I prefer that we stick with public voting, rather than moving to secret ballots. --Elonka 18:52, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  8. Durova349 20:12, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  9. Cirt (talk) 20:13, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  10. KISS. Short Brigade Harvester Boris (talk) 20:14, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  11. Oppose votes should have weight. Preferential voting is a bit scary, and it will only reward those who make an effort to become famous and loved in the run up to the election. Deacon of Pndapetzim (Talk) 20:21, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  12. John Carter (talk) 20:42, 30 October 2009 (UTC)\[reply]
  13. Per Boris. Sam Blacketer (talk) 20:54, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  14. Simple, clear, and understandable. DGG ( talk ) 21:15, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  15. Offliner (talk) 22:30, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  16. I don't see the added benefit of the more complicated methods for our purposes.  Sandstein  22:32, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  17. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 22:58, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  18. Simple. -Atmoz (talk) 02:05, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  19. Possibly other systems are better, but need to think about it more. Carcharoth (talk) 07:42, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  20. I admit to finding other systems exceedingly frustrating. This still works fine. Heimstern Läufer (talk) 13:18, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  21. Keep it simple. SlimVirgin talk|contribs 20:48, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  22. This seems simpler, but it also seems to be better at giving opposition a say. NellieBly (talk) 22:36, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  23. Because it works. Mailer Diablo 10:58, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  24. Simplest. AGK 12:44, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  25. Been okay so far. My main opposition to it is public opposes can spread ill-will, but this is negated by secret ballot. Casliber (talk · contribs) 13:54, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  26. Per the KISS_principle. >Radiant< 14:25, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  • Oppose the wording of this. The system used was not approval voting, due to the presence of 'oppose votes' which do not exist in an approval voting method. The existence of oppose votes actually produces something similar to the Borda count, which is much more complex and has significant downsides that have not been discussed. --Barberio (talk) 13:40, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Cumulative voting

Cumulative voting is a multiple-winner voting system intended to promote proportional representation while also being simple to understand.

An ideal setup would be to give each voter one vote per seat, for them to distribute across the candidates as they see fit (in whole numbers; no fractions). It does not have oppose votes, and it is simple.

  1. John Vandenberg (chat) 13:54, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. Actually this method, while sounding more complicated, would reflect the community's will far better than a simple support/oppose system where one can only give equal preference to different candidates they want to support. Regards SoWhy 13:56, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. This is the method that people actually use in the real world - you know, where things have been demonstrated to work in practice as opposed to both fail in practice and in theory, like we have here. Hipocrite (talk) 14:11, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. No strong opinion on this issue. However, this method seems worth a try. —Finn Casey * * * 17:12, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. — Jake Wartenberg 21:21, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Approval AND Cumulative voting

Basically: Have Support/Neutral/Oppose, as in approval voting, but only can support a number of candidates up to the number of seats available, as in cumulative voting.

  1. - jc37 03:58, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]


Preferential voting

Preferential voting is a method by which voters rank the candidates in order of preference, so that winners are selected based on the breadth and depth of support for their candidacies. An example of preferential voting is the Schulze method which was used in the 2008 and 2009 Wikimedia Foundation Board of Trustees elections.

  1. Only if Support/Oppose is resoundingly rejected. This is over-complicated to start off with.  Roger Davies talk 13:10, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. Davewild (talk) 13:23, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. Second preference (first is cumulative). Reagrds SoWhy 13:56, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. Preferential systems are much better at representing the wishes of voters as a whole. They are easy to understand once one grasps the initial concept, as I think the WMF board vote (and their long-standing use in legislative elections) shows. Approval voting is a crude metric that allows the election of candidates which a sizeable minority of voters might strongly disapprove of, encourages tactical voting and cannot express any difference in strengths of support (If I vote for eight candidates, it treats this expressing equal support for all eight, which is likely to be highly distorting). It's time we matured.  Skomorokh, barbarian  13:58, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. Everyking (talk) 14:30, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. This system is as complicated as the voter wants it to, giving maximum freedom to the voter. Most of the complications are in the counting instead of the voting. If the voter prefers to make a simple "approval" vote, just put a "1" next to all you approve, and "2" next to those you disapprove, and if you want something more sophisticated feel free. I prefer this over cumulative voting because it allows people to support more candidates than there are seats (if they are mostly interested in preventing someone getting on ArbCom), and making 100% support behind a single candidate an attractive option is not so good if there are multiple seats. Sjakkalle (Check!) 15:54, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  7. --Jayron32 21:07, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  8. Always. Any system of preferential voting is ideal (I personally like IRV) when compared to a system that is biased towards polarizing candidates. As Sjakkalle points out, this essentially includes Support/Oppose as an option within it. ~ Amory (u • t • c) 23:23, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  9. This system has many benefits. However there should be some mechanismm to prevent joke candidates from running. A problem with approval voting is that it gives disproportionate weight to opposition. If 80% is the threshold then 21% of the participants can veto any candidate. With a larger committee it's desirable to have a great range of views, even ones that might not be supported by a quarter of the community.   Will Beback  talk  23:36, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  10. I'm not sure why people think this is complicated. For voters, it's simply ranking candidates in order. I would actually say this is simpler than cumulative voting and on a par with approval. For counting, although Schulze method looks scary, there are established and trusted programs that will do all that for us. the wub "?!" 00:38, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  11. I'd prefer range voting (see the "Bayesian regret" analysis), but since it's not an option and I'm not so bold as to add it, this is the next best option. --Cybercobra (talk) 02:20, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  12. This is a much better expression of individual and community will and should be adopted more widely on WP (whether Schultze, here, or a simpler method for some RfCs). Voters don't have to be experts in operating the system it to cast their rankings. Voters are encouraged to weigh up their preference for candidates rather more carefully than under the clunky, ham-fisted Support/Oppose system (and I still couldn't work out how the final percentage was calculated lat December, and was too shy to ask). I presume Schultze for ArbCom would be "optional preferential", where voters don't have to rank all candidates, but choose how many they wish to rank; but it doesn't matter—it's still the best on offer. My second choice would be "Cumulative voting". Why couldn't we have listed these very alternatives here in terms of ranked preferences? (3,2,4,1 so simple) Tony (talk) 06:04, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  13. Preferential voting will tend to favor the candidates you have widest support, even if that support is less massive in absolute numbers. This improves the odd that the selected candidates end up being "acceptable" to most of the electorate, even if some others would have been more strongly supported by specific groups (and thus also more polarizing; which is, IMO, an undesirable property). — Coren (talk) 12:49, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  14. Simplest true proportional rep vote to implement. 'Oppose' voting has been primarily used tactically and not as a honest statement of preference in previous votes, in particular with some campaigning to ask for oppose votes against all other candidates in order to double their 'net vote'.--Barberio (talk) 13:09, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  15. Will more accurately reflect the will of the community, and as others have said it really is as complicated as users want it to be, with it being up to voters on how many candidates they rank. Camaron · Christopher · talk 20:25, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  16. Yes, being Irish I'd support PR-STV. Stifle (talk) 21:22, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  17. Yes. I dislike the current system, as it tends to favour candidates who offend few, but may also be the only weakly preferred by any. I'd rather see some candidates who may represent strong minority interests have a chance.--Scott Mac (Doc) 23:50, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  18. Markus Schulze 11:29, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  19. RP459 (talk) 13:25, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Public v. Secret Voting

Previous Request for Comment: ArbCom secret ballot


Public voting

Votes are made and signed publicly; anyone can see how a user has voted.

  1. Go openly as we have always done without any real problems. Seriously, what is trying to be fixed by making everything a secret? We're meant to be open and honest. Arbcom is not a government.Majorly talk 17:40, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. Especially with something as important as ArbCom, which really depends on a perception of community trust, open and public voting is the way go. --Elonka 17:56, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. Who watches the watchmen? Hipocrite (talk) 19:28, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. We definitely need to have everything out in the open. Arbcom already handles too many things in secret. Tex (talk) 19:39, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. I don't think there are significant problems with this method and there are advantages of transparency and openness. Christopher Parham (talk) 19:49, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. Primarily to handle sophisticated Poetlister-like sockfarm voting schemes. A public and open vote is harder to game, and easier to remedy if fraud occurs. Durova349 20:19, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  7. Being more open also makes it, as Durova indicated, easier to check up on. John Carter (talk) 20:43, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  8. --Jayron32 21:08, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  9. The best reason against public voting, tactical voting, would be greatly reduced by preferential voting, and even without preferential voting, is overwhelmed by problems associated with secret voting. -kotra (talk) 21:49, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  10. Most definitely, to preserve transparency and facilitate discussion. Open discourse is essential in the way we operate and is most necessary in the deciding of our upper-level officials. ThemFromSpace 22:15, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  11. Deacon of Pndapetzim (Talk) 22:34, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  12. Previous rfc spoke of buying votes. Not quite sure what currency was intended, but I'm open to offers :) MoreThings (talk) 00:44, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  13. Secret ballots are a terrible idea. A public vote enables us to see the cabals and cliques in action, and weight their views accordingly. A secret ballot opens the way to off-wiki canvassing and tactical voting on a massive scale, and we'd never know. Moreschi (talk) 01:54, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  14. Open. User:Themfromspace said exactly what I was thinking. While I do like the convenience of secure poll, I like having a permanent record on the wiki, even more. That and, if secret ballots start happening, I think we'll have to raise the requirement for voting, since it will be less transparent. - jc37 02:02, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  15. Open. -Atmoz (talk) 02:05, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  16. What I said here: it's helpful to both the community and candidates to see who voted for/against and why. Also, if some arbitrators are obviously using their position to "get back" at people who opposed them (though I can't think of a situation where this happened), they should be removed immediately. RfA/Bs aren't done in secret (and it's a good thing they're not), so neither should these. I'm disappointed that the secret voting method was pushed through in an RfC where less than 100 people participated, especially when hundreds of people vote in the ArbCom elections. Acalamari 02:14, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  17. I note that many respected community members present convincing arguments for a secret vote. However, Wikipedia is not an experiment in democracy. The same arguments regarding retribution and bloc voting could be made regarding RfA & RfB, but no one is seriously proposing a secret approval vote for administrator privileges. There is no compelling reason to exempt this election from the traditional open consensus model that has proved to be the foundation of Wikipedia. —Finn Casey * * * 02:33, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  18. I agree with Finn Casey. The public system has previously worked fine and it is much more useful to identify canvassing attempts than a secret voting system would be. Regards SoWhy 10:21, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  19. Everyking (talk) 13:25, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  20. While I do understand the reasons for going over to a secret ballot, I haven't seen enough evidence of intimidation based on votes to consider it to be at the same threat level as possible unchecked meatpuppety and cabalism under a secret ballot. Heimstern Läufer (talk) 13:29, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  21. I'm sympathetic to some of the arguments for secret ballots. But in my years on Wikipedia I've seen arbcom correspondence published on Wikipedia Review, leaking of mailing lists, postings of detailed personal information, and many other things to make me extremely skeptical that "secret" balloting would be truly secret. Short Brigade Harvester Boris (talk) 19:46, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  22. Secret ballots have their advantages, but the principal advantages don't really help us any and the disadvantages are particularly salient. Wikipedia does not have an (explicit) problem with voter intimidation. Wikipedia has a serious problem with the appearance of backstage dealings and private power struggles. A secret ballot works well if you trust the mechanism and you trust the reporter. Even in advanced democracies, there are legitimacy problems with the mechanism and the reporting. We should not pretend that technology obviates those problems for us (because they are mostly in the minds of critics). Obviously the argument will be made that WP is going to use some third party tech (probably hosted on some third party site), but how long will we go before we realize that candidate A has received an anomalous number of negative votes and have to 'correct' for this (in the sense that we might if they were public? What happens if we have to knock 100 votes off a tally? How do we explain this verifiably? Do we say "trust us, we would only remove truly illegitimate votes"? If we ignore non-technical disruption (i.e. we allow any account within some set parameters to vote and never molest the count), how do we deal with the obvious problems of ballot stuffing, double voting, etc? Protonk (talk) 08:50, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  23. I agree with Protonk. I also think that (very) marginal benefits of the secret ballot do not justify the extreme complexity of their organization in such an open editing environment as Wikipedia. Ruslik_Zero 12:05, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  24. Public voting is always preferable, but I'd like us to use some variant of the SecurePoll interface that allows the public to see who voted, and for which candidates. This setup would remedy the problems pointed out by Durova, as would allowing the checkusers full access to the voting logs (as they would have for on-wiki voting). AGK 12:50, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  25. Per Finn and Boris. Wikipedia has always been based on openness. We have already seen Arbitration moving from a mostly open, interactive process to something that mostly happens on the private mailing list - and that has not been an improvement. What's next, anonymous contributions to articles so that stalking becomes harder? Voting on Wikipedia is voluntary. Most actions are under public scrutiny, and should be. That's what protects us from the abuse of power - not increasing levels of obscurity and intransparency. --Stephan Schulz (talk) 13:13, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  26. Essentially what Protonk said. Transparency is very important, and Wikipedia has repeatedly made the mistake of thinking that problems can be resolved by hiding information from the public. >Radiant< 14:26, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Secret voting (SecurePoll)

Votes are recorded and tallied by MediaWiki; the lists of "who voted" and "which candidates were voted for" are separated, so no one can see which way a user voted. A real time tally of who has voted is publicly-viewable (example from the current AUSC election).

  1. As I supported on the previous request for comment on this issue. Davewild (talk) 18:06, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  2. SPLETTE :] How's my driving? 19:35, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  3. Cirt (talk) 20:13, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  4. It is more likely that socks would be caught with SecurePoll as all IP information is available to the scrutineers. Having legitimate elections unbiased by social pressure is very important. It is also important to remember that the lists of who voted will be open to all. — Jake Wartenberg 21:22, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  5. As per the previous RFC. Voting without fear of retribution or harassment is more important than catching socks. That said, SecurePoll allows everyone to see who is voting, so it is still possible to look for accounts which appear to be socks. John Vandenberg (chat) 21:38, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  6. Per Wikipedia:Requests_for_comment/ArbCom_secret_ballot, where this was generally supported. Please read for pros and cons. Why are we doing this again? Is this RfC advertised widely enough, or should we plan three more just in case? Nathan T 21:56, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  7. Vote secrecy is very important. Offliner (talk) 22:32, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  8. The current implementation seems to allow for adequate antisock safeguards, and secret votes are more likely to correctly represent community opinion, since the whole social networking aspect is filtered out.  Sandstein  22:36, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  9. If the safeguards against fraud are in place then this is better system then open voting.   Will Beback  talk  23:38, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  10. It's not often I prefer secrecy to openness, but John Vandenberg said it best. the wub "?!" 23:59, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  11. As per Jake W, John V and Sandstein Manning (talk) 01:47, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  12. Per John Vandenberg and Sandstein. ArbCom elections are explicitly not a "consensus" - they are a majority vote, as such we should treat it as one, and not as some sort of discussion-less discussion. Mr.Z-man 03:11, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  13. Per this discussion, but we should re-evaluate next year in the event new problems surface as a result of secret balloting. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 03:38, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  14. (i) It makes an arbitrator's job more difficult, not easier, to know who supported or who opposed them (yes, people do bring this up). (ii) I'm cannot see why it's anyone else's business how I choose to cast my votes. (iii) Public voting disenfranchises those who are not confident about speaking up publicly and those who fear having their votes challenged by vociferous editors with an axe to grind.  Roger Davies talk 04:03, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  15. Exactly what Roger said. In addition, private voting is the obvious system to minimise the incentives for canvassing and, in a mirror image, for secretive influence before and after the election. Tony (talk) 06:11, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  16. The sensible thing to do, for all of the reasons outlined above. --Malleus Fatuorum 06:19, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  17. There should be no possibility of peer pressure on how you vote. Sjakkalle (Check!) 07:30, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  18. But only if there is vigorous and open public debate on the candidates and their election statements and answers to questions. That, coupled with open declarations of support where people prefer to do that, and analysis of the list of voters (which is available for all to see), should meet most concerns. But no-one should be forced to disclose who they voted for, unless they choose to do so. Carcharoth (talk) 07:52, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  19. It's no coincidence that absolutely every single true democratic system of the world uses secret ballots. The ability for voters to pick candidates without having to publicly justify their decision, or being able to "prove" they voted one way or another to a third party, and fundamental requirements of true democracy. Having public voting is an invitation to manipulation, coercion, and bribery. — Coren (talk) 12:54, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  20. Strong preference for secure voting that lets people give there opinion publicly or not as they personally choose. Under this system people will be able to ask questions and make comments about their preferred candidates. But the voting will be outside the view of other people thus making people more likely to freely give their opinion. I see this as extremely important because of the nature of the work done by the Arbitration Committee. FloNight♥♥♥♥ 14:28, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  21. I like the community have found myself divided on this, though I have ultimately come down in favour of secret voting. No matter if it is public or private this is going to be a democratic vote. The consensus model is good and works in many places, but not in something with hundreds of people participating. Unlike processes such as AfD it also is really down to personal opinion on who you support or oppose, not policy and guidelines, hence a secret vote is more appropriate. Public discussion about candidates will likely happen anyway, but on this model it is up to voters to decide on if to make their votes public or not, and privacy may in many cases improve honesty. I personally have already decided that I am to give feedback to candidates as I did last year, and I'm sure others will join in. I respect concerns over corruption e.t.c. with a secret vote but such issues should not be insurmountable if given proper attention. Finally, a secret vote allows a fairer election system to be used (per above). Camaron · Christopher · talk 20:39, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  22. We need a secret ballot for all the reasons democratic states use them; people are otherwise reluctant to express their views, and may support or oppose under peer pressure. SlimVirgin talk|contribs 20:51, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  23. Any risk of socking is countered by the fact that the information still exists and, IP-wise, can be checked if needed. Ironholds (talk) 22:25, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  24. Many people won't vote in a public ballot for fear their vote will be held against them. A secret ballot may be more representative for that reason, and as Ironholds says socks can still be ferreted out if necessary. --NellieBly (talk) 22:38, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  25. Fairer and less open to manipulation.--Scott Mac (Doc) 23:51, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  26. Per many above, particularly Coren. I agree with SandyGeorgia's point about revisiting this, as well.--chaser (talk) 07:06, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  27. A much better idea. Stifle (talk) 10:29, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  28. I like what I'm seeing in the AUSC elections. We could save ourselves a lot of drama on this. - Mailer Diablo 10:59, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  29. Markus Schulze 11:29, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  30. RP459 (talk) 13:25, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]
  31. Roger Davies summed it up succinctly - furthermore as an arb, as was aware of who supported me and who opposed me. This did cross my mind when people came up in arbitration and I had to judge their actions, although I did my best to ignore or negate any feelings I had. This more than anything pushes me to a secret ballot, as an open voting process can subtly impact on arb impartiality subsequently. Casliber (talk · contribs) 14:00, 1 November 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Views

View by John Vandenberg

Three years is a long time to be strapped to these chairs. It is a commitment that many sensible people are not able to make because they have a real life in addition to Wikipedia, or they don't know what the next three years holds for them. Reducing the term to two years will mean more candidates feel comfortable making the commitment, and feel capable of enduring to the end of their term. The argument that shorter terms result in loss of institutional knowledge don't sit well with me. After a shorter term, arbs can seek re-election or retire to be a functionary, where their knowledge can easily be tapped into.

One of the themes of the 2008 arbcom RFC was that arbitrators rarely ever make it to the end of their allocated term, and that the committee becomes unexpectedly short staffed when an arb resigns or retires. One way to alleviate this is to have extra non-voting members in the committee at the beginning of each year, and allocate them to work initially on the constant stream of ban appeals and other auxiliary tasks.

With a committee of 18 people next year, of which only 12 are voting members, six people can be working on the tasks which would otherwise divert arbitrator attention away from case work, and there is a pool of six people who are "in sync" with the committee and are able to rotate into a voting seat to account for inactivity, retirements or resignations.

The goal for 2010 could be to always have 12 voting members active on arbitration pages, while also ensuring that committee members take proper breaks to recharge their batteries.


View by rspεεr: tranches are obsolete

We have a tremendous opportunity to simplify the system here. Let's finish the job and do away with the obsolete notion of "tranches". Instead, we should give every elected arbitrator a term of the same length (which I'm assuming is two years).

Tranches were a system of staggering the expiration dates of the arb seats, even if this meant giving different term lengths to different people elected in the same election. They were devised based on the assumption that most arbitrators would finish their terms. This assumption turns out not to be true, so tranches serve no purpose.

I think many people are assuming this will happen anyway, because there has been no discussion about how to convert the three-year tranches into two-year tranches if we adopt two-year terms, but we might as well make this explicit to avoid confusion. Here's my specific proposal:

  • An arbitrator who is elected in a yearly election gets to keep their seat until the end of the election two years later.
  • An arbitrator who is appointed mid-year by some other process (should this situation arise) gets to keep their seat until the end of the next election.
  • An arbitrator who was elected before tranches were abolished keeps the same expiration date they already had in their tranche.

rspεεr (talk) 08:09, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by SoWhy: Defending cumulative voting

Risker has outlined above that they think cumulative voting is too complex to be used in ArbCom elections and I think some people considering how to opine in this RFC will share such doubts. I think they are misplaced though. Cumulative voting can be both simple and complex, allowing both simply support/oppose votes and more complex preferences to be cast.
Let me elaborate with an example:

Let's assume the election will be held to fill 8 seats. As a result, each voter will get 8 votes. They can now choose the simple or the complex voting system. If they choose the simple one, they can support as many candidates as they wish but don't have to. Their votes will automatically be distributed equally amongst those candidates. For example, if they support 4 candidates, each one will receive 2 votes while the voter's only thing to do was to choose the candidates to support. The rest is done by the software. This means that the election is very simple for those who wish it to be.
For those who want to rank their candidates, cumulative voting would allow them to choose a different option when voting. They could give multiple votes (although I think there should be a limit per candidate, e.g. 3 votes maximum) to those candidates they prefer over others at the cost of not being able to support 8 candidates. For example, candidate A could receive 3 votes and candidates B and C 2 votes each with the last vote going to candidate Z.
All voters can decide only to use a certain number of their votes but are not forced to do so.

Cumulative voting has also the advantage that there are no oppose votes which are frankly not needed. Since the system means that those with the highest amount of votes will be elected, we also get rid of the need for having to set a bar, i.e. requiring a certain % of support. As such, I think this system would satisfy both the need for simplicity for the majority of users as well as the request for preferential voting that many experienced users probably have. Regards SoWhy 15:26, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by Finn Casey

  • A simplification of the present tri-tranche system is desirable. A two-year staggered term length system would give the process both clarity and stability. Electing half the arbitrators each year to a two-year term will be much simpler than the present arrangement. Such a process will also tend to reduce the endemic drop-out problem.
  • Wikipedia has traditionally operated in an open atmosphere. There is no compelling reason to switch to an atmosphere of secrecy to indulge the theoretical fears of certain editors. We are not, and do not wish to be, a real-life political system. Wikipedia is at its best when it is free of the partisanship that is evident in real-life secret elections.

View by Majorly

Seriously, why change what worked perfectly well (with regards to how we vote)? Majorly talk 17:43, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by Jayron32

The Oppose/Support system works well for proposals and many other things at Wikipedia, but for elections where people are being chosen to fill an office, such things become bogged down in discussion, which often spirals out of control. A simple vote works much better in these cases, the "support/oppose" system is too open to hijacking by a few dedicated "haters". Lets instead keep discussion on discussion pages, and let the voting be unsullied by such events. Furthermore, not voting support in an election like this is equal to oppose anyways. --Jayron32 21:16, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by Offliner

Arbitrators should have one year terms only. Two years is very long time in Wikipedia. Personally, I'm extremely disappointed with the low efficiency of the previous and current ArbComs, and I think the community should have reasonably quick way of getting rid of bad arbitrators who cannot organize their work properly. Anything longer than a year is way too long — it allows the arbitrators to become confident that no matter how sloppy they are, they will still be allowed to continue for what is basically an eternity in WP. Cases dragging on for months is simply ridiculous, as is the extreme uncommunicativity of the committee members (it often takes weeks for ArbCom to answer even simple yes-or-no questions.) I'm 100% certain that the job can be done much better than that. We need to keep changing the Arbs in a quick fashion to try to find a constitution that works. I'd also like to note that, in contrast to real life, organizing elections doesn't cost anything in WP, so I really do not see any reason why we couldn't organize an election every year. Offliner (talk) 22:56, 30 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by Durova

If the problem is herding cats, one doesn't solve that problem by making the herd larger. ArbCom's core mission is to evaluate evidence in relation to policies. The larger the Committee gets, the harder it becomes to discuss matters and achieve quorum. Delays make problems worse because disruptive editors deliberately clog case pages.[1]

Moreover, what Wikipedia needs right now is better checks and balances. The principal check and balance upon ArbCom is Jimbo, but he's been under considerable pressure to refrain from intervention. That leaves a vacuum which would be healthier to replace with new bodies that serve separate functions and that answer directly to the community. A larger Committee is not the solution: that way leads to oligarchy. Durova349 04:26, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by Carcharoth

Copied from earlier post elsewhere.

In the interests of transparency, I'm going to post my views here. I'm speaking here as a community member, with current experience of the arbitration committee, and as someone who thinks that ultimately the community should decide issues such as the size of the committee, and the term lengths, and the voting method.

  • Term lengths - I think two years is a good term length. It is long enough to effect changes and to get up to speed in the first six months. Three years is too long, and two sets of two-year services (ideally with a break in-between) is better than two lots of three-year services. The problems arise with turnover and the need to keep the committee stable (having more than half its members change each year is not good). If you have elections to fill all vacant seats with 2-year terms, then the number of seats up for election depends on the number of resignations, and the number of departing arbs whose term has ended (though they can, of course, run for re-election). Ideally, you would have staggered terms (i.e. tranches), as this avoids situations where you have (say) eight seats up for election one year, six seats up for election the next year, and twelve the year after that (this is the current situation given the number of arbs on 1-, 2-, and 3-year terms, if all eight seats this year were appointed to 2-year terms). [...] The advantage of a three-tranche system is that you don't replace half the committee each year (that can also be a disadvantage), but the disadvantage is that if you have annual elections, you need three-year terms, which are too long for some. The advantage of a two-tranche system is that you only need 2-year terms, but the disadvantage is that you replace half the committee each year and if arbitrators resign the year they were elected, then the following election results in more than half the committee being replaced (i.e. less stability). It's not an easy thing to weigh in the balance.
  • Size of committee - I think 18 is a workable size (though at the upper limit). 15 would also be workable (though if you have 2-year terms, you either need an even number of seats, or the theoretical number of seats available for election goes up and down by one each year). I think anything below 12 becomes unworkable when you have arbitrators either resigned, recused, or inactive/burnt out, as you can end up with as few as 5 arbitrators voting on an issue towards the end of the year, which is not good. So anything between 18 and 12 is workable, in my view, with a preference for a number between 15 and 18 to allow for resignations and inactivity/burnout.
  • Voting method - I have reservations about secret ballots, but some of the arguments for this have swayed me. My primary concern is that the discussions and "endorsement" pages that will inevitably spring up will get out of hand. There should be vigorous discussions about the candidates, but it should be kept under control. I do think more discussion about the practicalities of a secret ballot are needed (the RfC endorsed the concept, but little was said about how it would work in practice). I would urge those following these discussions to follow the AUSC elections and help point out and correct any bugs or problems that arise.

So overall, 2-year term lengths, 18 arbs on the committee, and secret ballot (for this year at least). With the caveat that three of the eight seats this year need to be for 1-year terms to avoid a pile-up of 12 seats for re-election in December 2011. And repeating here that this is my personal view, and that these issues are, ultimately, for the community to decide. Carcharoth (talk) 07:10, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by jc37

(To whoever assesses the RFC for consensus, please include these comments as part of determining my position on the issues.)

As may be seen by my "votes" above, I'm a bit torn beyween 2 year terms and 3 year terms. So to clarify:

If it's to be 3 years with 3 tranches, then it should be 15 members. With 3 tranches of 5.
If it's to be 2 years with 2 tranches, then it should be 16 members. With 2 tranches of 8

1 year is too short, and 18 members is just too many. (We're just creeping too close to 20.)

I'd like to see the Support/Neutral/Oppose method, but modified so that each voter must vote in support of a number of candidates equal to the number of seats. No less and no more. (I've commented more about this on the talk page.)

I don't like any method which does not allow for someone to oppose a candidate.

And while I am sympathetic to concerns, secret ballots are simply anti-wiki.

And whatever is decided here should be loosely configured, so that User:Jimbo Wales can modify as the situation may merit. - jc37 09:47, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

View by Vecrumba

It typically takes someone six months to learn the basics of a job, a year to become proficient in it. I would suggest two year terms for first time individuals, with their having the option to re-up for one more to three. Prior members can serve again for as little as one year, with an option to re-up to a total of three. I have not seen any persuasive argument that more members translate to an improvement in throughput or efficiency.

Equally importantly, work needs to be done on improving due process, if you will, where "appeal to Jimbo" or lobbying until one finds a "receptive" admin are discouraged. That is completely independent of how many or for how long. Issues of efficacy and efficiency relate to proper organization and enforcement of workflow, not to the number of hands on deck. We should take care not to conflate the two.  PЄTЄRS VЄСRUМВА ►talk  23:06, 31 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]

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