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Smith v. United States (1993)

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Smith v. United States
Argued March 23, 1993
Decided June 1, 1993
Full case nameJohn Angus Smith, Petitioner v. United States
Citations508 U.S. 223 (more)
113 S. Ct. 2050; 124 L. Ed. 2d 138; 1993 U.S. LEXIS 3740; 61 U.S.L.W. 4503; 93 Cal. Daily Op. Service 3929; 93 Daily Journal DAR 6966; 7 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 326
Case history
PriorOn writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Holding
The exchange of a gun for drugs constitutes "use" of the firearm for purposes of a federal statute imposing penalties for "use" of a firearm "during and in relation to" a drug trafficking crime.
Court membership
Chief Justice
William Rehnquist
Associate Justices
Byron White · Harry Blackmun
John P. Stevens · Sandra Day O'Connor
Antonin Scalia · Anthony Kennedy
David Souter · Clarence Thomas
Case opinions
MajorityO'Connor, joined by Rehnquist, White, Blackmun, Kennedy, Thomas
ConcurrenceBlackmun
DissentScalia, joined by Stevens, Souter

Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993), is a United States Supreme Court case that held that the exchange of a gun for drugs constituted "use" of the firearm for purposes of a federal statute imposing penalties for "use" of a firearm "during and in relation to" a drug trafficking crime.

In Watson v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 697 (2007) the court later decided that a transaction in the opposite direction does not violate the same statute (i.e., Smith holds that one "uses" a gun by giving it in exchange for drugs, but Watson holds that one does not "use" a gun by receiving it in exchange for drugs).

Statutory Context and Sentencing

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The defendant exchanged a firearm for cocaine and was convicted of drug trafficking. The prosecution claimed this triggered enhanced sentencing because of the "use" of the gun in the commission of a crime.[1] The defendant stated using a firearm for barter was not covered by the statutory meaning of "use".[2] The Supreme Court had found that in a subsection of the statute, firearms could be 'used' as objects of commerce rather than as weapons, implying that a similar understanding and interpretation of 'used' should apply to the disputed sentence.[3]

See also

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References

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  1. ^ NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 938-39 (2017)
  2. ^ Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 717 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
  3. ^ NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 938-39 (2017)