Cognitive bias: Difference between revisions

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[[File:Cognitive_Bias_Codex_-_180%2B_biases%2C_designed_by_John_Manoogian_III_%28jm3%29.jpg|thumb|The Cognitive Bias Codex]]
 
A '''cognitive bias''' is a systematic pattern of deviation from [[norm (philosophy)|norm]] or rationality in judgment.<ref name = "Haselton_2005">{{cite book| vauthors = Haselton MG, Nettle D, Andrews PW | chapter = The evolution of cognitive bias.|year=2005|location = Hoboken, NJ, US | publisher = John Wiley & Sons Inc| veditors = Buss DM | title = The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology|pages=724–746 }}</ref> However, cognitive biases originate from heuristics that were at one point useful for humans but that interfere with rational judgement, and thus are not defects in normal brain function but the application of heuristics that give less accurate results then modes of thinking which reject are based on more objective rationality. While all ndividuals create their own "subjective reality" from their perception of input, cognitive biases interfere with forming more objectively verifiable models of reality. An individual's construction of reality, not the [[Objectivity (philosophy)|objective]] input, usually dictates their [[behavior]] in the world. Thus, cognitive biases may sometimes lead to inaccurate perceptions, inaccurate judgment, illogical interpretation, and [[irrationality]].<ref>{{cite journal |vauthors=Kahneman D, Tversky A |year=1972 |title=Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness |journal=Cognitive Psychology |volume=3 |issue=3 |pages=430–454 |doi=10.1016/0010-0285(72)90016-3 |url=http://datacolada.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Kahneman-Tversky-1972.pdf |access-date=2017-04-01 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191214120047/http://datacolada.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Kahneman-Tversky-1972.pdf |archive-date=2019-12-14 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite book| vauthors = Baron J | date = 2007 | title = Thinking and Deciding | edition = 4th | location = New York, NY | publisher = Cambridge University Press }}</ref><ref name="Ariely.2008">{{cite book| last=Ariely |first=Dan | name-list-style = vanc |author-link=Dan Ariely| year=2008| title=Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions| location=New York, NY| publisher=[[HarperCollins]] |isbn=978-0-06-135323-9|title-link=Predictably Irrational }}</ref>
 
While cognitive biases may initially appear to be negative, some are adaptive. They may lead to more effective actions in a given context.<ref>For instance: {{cite journal | vauthors = Gigerenzer G, Goldstein DG | title = Reasoning the fast and frugal way: models of bounded rationality | journal = Psychological Review | volume = 103 | issue = 4 | pages = 650–69 | date = October 1996 | pmid = 8888650 | doi = 10.1037/0033-295X.103.4.650 | hdl = 21.11116/0000-0000-B771-2 | url = http://library.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/ft/gg/gg_reasoning_1996.pdf | citeseerx = 10.1.1.174.4404 }}</ref> Furthermore, allowing cognitive biases enables faster decisions which can be desirable when timeliness is more valuable than accuracy, as illustrated in [[Heuristic (psychology)|heuristics]].<ref name="h_and_b">{{cite journal | vauthors = Tversky A, Kahneman D | title = Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases | journal = Science | volume = 185 | issue = 4157 | pages = 1124–31 | date = September 1974 | pmid = 17835457 | doi = 10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 | bibcode = 1974Sci...185.1124T | s2cid = 143452957 }}</ref> Other cognitive biases are a "by-product" of human processing limitations,<ref name="Haselton_2005" /> resulting from a lack of appropriate mental mechanisms ([[bounded rationality]]), the impact of an individual's constitution and biological state (see [[embodied cognition]]), or simply from a limited capacity for information processing.<ref>{{cite book| vauthors = Bless H, Fiedler K, Strack F |title=Social cognition: How individuals construct social reality.|year=2004|publisher=Hove and New York: Psychology Press.}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Morewedge CK, Kahneman D | title = Associative processes in intuitive judgment | journal = Trends in Cognitive Sciences | volume = 14 | issue = 10 | pages = 435–40 | date = October 2010 | pmid = 20696611 | pmc = 5378157 | doi = 10.1016/j.tics.2010.07.004 }}</ref> Research suggests that cognitive biases can make individuals more inclined to endorsing pseudoscientific beliefs by requiring less evidence for claims that confirm their preconceptions. This can potentially distort their perceptions and lead to inaccurate judgments.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Rodríguez-Ferreiro |first1=Javier |last2=Barberia |first2=Itxaso |date=2021-12-21 |title=Believers in pseudoscience present lower evidential criteria |journal=Scientific Reports |language=en |volume=11 |issue=1 |pages=24352 |doi=10.1038/s41598-021-03816-5 |issn=2045-2322 |pmc=8692588 |pmid=34934119|bibcode=2021NatSR..1124352R }}</ref>