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{{Electoral systems}}
'''Majority judgment''' ('''MJ''') is a single-winner [[voting system]] proposed in 2007 by [[Michel Balinski]] and Rida Laraki.<ref name=":0" /><ref>{{cite book|author= M. Balinski & R. Laraki|year=2010|title=Majority Judgment. |publisher=MIT |isbn=978-0-262-01513-4}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=de Swart|first=Harrie|date=2021-11-16|title=How to Choose a President, Mayor, Chair: Balinski and Laraki Unpacked
Unlike other voting methods, MJ guarantees that the winner between three or more candidates will be the candidate who had received an absolute majority of the highest grades given by all the voters.
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The tie-breaking procedure of Majority Judgment elects the Left candidate, as this candidate is the one with the non-median rating closest to the median, and this non-median rating is above the median rating. In so doing, the majority judgment elects the best compromise for voters on the left side of the political axis (as they are slightly more numerous than those on the right) instead of choosing a more consensual candidate such as the centre-left or the center. The reason is that the tie-breaking is based on the rating closest to the median, regardless of the other ratings.
Note that other [[highest median voting rules|highest median rules]] that take into account the ratings on either side of the median, such as the [[typical judgment]] or the [[usual judgment]], would not elect the Left candidate as in the case of the majority judgment, but would elect the Center candidate. These other rules would in this case respect the [[Condorcet criterion]]. These methods, introduced more recently, thus verify the desirable properties of the majority judgment while avoiding its main pitfalls.<ref name="Fabre20">{{Cite journal |first=Adrien |last=Fabre |title=Tie-breaking the Highest Median: Alternatives to the Majority Judgment |journal=[[Social Choice and Welfare]]|date=2020 |volume=56 |pages=101–124 |url=https://github.com/bixiou/highest_median/raw/master/Tie-breaking%20Highest%20Median%20-%20Fabre%202019.pdf |doi=10.1007/s00355-020-01269-9 |s2cid=253851085 }}</ref>
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