Plurality decision: Difference between revisions

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Major rewrite of plurality opinion definition. This could still use improvement.
 
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{{Short description|Court decision with no majority opinion}}
{{Unreferencedrefimprove|date=December 2009}}
 
{{Judicial opinions}}
A '''plurality decision''' is a [[court decision]] in which no opinion received the support of a majority of the judges.
 
A '''plurality opinion''' is the [[judicial opinion]] fromor aopinions groupwhich ofreceived [[judge]]s,the oftenmost insupport anamong [[appellatethose court]], inopinions which no single opinion receivedsupported the supportplurality of a [[majority]] of the courtdecision. The plurality opinion did not receive the support of more than half the justices, but still received more support than any other opinion, excluding those justices dissenting from the holding of the court.
 
==By country==
In ''[[Marks v. United States]]'', 430 U.S. 188 (1977), the [[Supreme Court of the United States]] explained how the holding of a case should be viewed where there is no majority supporting the rationale of any opinion: “When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” ''Marks'', 430 U.S. at 193.
{{Expand section|date=May 2022}}
=== United States ===
 
In ''[[Marks v. United States]]'', 430 U.S. 188 (1977), the [[Supreme Court of the United States]] explained how the holding of a case should be viewed where there is no majority supporting the rationale of any opinion: “When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” ''<ref>Marks'' v. United States, 430 U.S. at188 193(1977).</ref>
The ''Marks Rule'' has raised the following schools of thought regarding the appropriate basis for determining the holding in such fractured cases: (a) the narrowest analysis essential to the result derived from a combination of all concurring opinions, (''Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Tex., Inc.'', 343 F.3d 355, 358-59 (5th Cir. 2003)); (b) the concurring opinion offering the narrowest rationale, (''e.g. Horn v. Thoratec Corp.'', 376 F.3d 163, 175-76 (3d Cir. 2004)); or (c) only those parts of the concurring opinions which overlap and arrive at the same result. For example, if one follows the first interpretation, then the holding in the case should be viewed as the narrowest rationale supported by all of the concurring opinions read together as though it were a single majority opinion, and where there is a conflict, the opinion based on the narrowest ground governs. Followers of the second rationale would find the concurring opinion offering the narrowest analysis to be the holding. Whereas, under the third interpretation, only the rationale(s) common to all concurring opinions which arrive at the same result(s) (and to the exclusion of all other rationales) is considered the holding.
 
That requires lower courts to look at all opinions to determine which is the most narrow compared to others. This opinion will be called the '''controlling opinion''', and can be a mere concurrence, not the plurality.<ref>https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/428/153/case.html ''[[Gregg v. Georgia]]'' (1976) "the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds"</ref>
 
The ''Marks Rule'' has raised the following schools of thought regarding the appropriate basis for determining the holding in such fractured cases: (a) the narrowest analysis essential to the result derived from a combination of all concurring opinions, (<ref>''Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Tex., Inc.'', 343 F.3d 355, 358-59 (5th Cir. 2003));</ref> (b) the concurring opinion offering the narrowest rationale, (<ref>''e.g. Horn v. Thoratec Corp.'', 376 F.3d 163, 175-76 (3d Cir. 2004));</ref> or (c) only those parts of the concurring opinions which overlap and arrive at the same result. For example, if one follows the first interpretation, then the holding in the case should be viewed as the narrowest rationale supported by all of the concurring opinions read together as though it were a single majority opinion, and where there is a conflict, the opinion based on the narrowest ground governs. Followers of the second rationale would find the concurring opinion offering the narrowest analysis to be the holding. Whereas, under the third interpretation, only the rationale(s) common to all concurring opinions which arrive at the same result(s) (and to the exclusion of all other rationales) is considered the holding.
 
A good example of a plurality opinion can be found in the Supreme Court's decision in ''[[Crawford v. Marion County Election Board]]'', 553 U.S. 181 (2008). In considering whether Indiana's voter identification law passed constitutional muster, three justices believed the proper analysis was to apply the balancing approach laid down in ''[[Anderson v. Celebrezze]]'', 460 U.S. 780 (1983). Three other justices agreed with the outcome of the ''Anderson'' approach, but believed the proper analysis was to apply the rule in ''Burdick v. Takushi'', 504 U.S. 428 (1992), which "forged ''Anderson'''s amorphous 'flexible standard' into something resembling an administrable rule." Regardless of the approach used, a reading of the opinions together results in a holding that "neutral, nondiscriminatory regulation of voting procedure" is constitutional so long as the burden imposed by the regulation is minimal or not severe.
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==References==
{{reflist}}
 
== Further reading ==
<references />
{{refbegin|40em}}
* {{cite journal | last1=Berry | first1=Melissa M. | last2=Kochan | first2=Donald J. | last3=Parlow | first3=Matthew J. | date=2008 | title=Much ado about pluralities: Pride and precedent amidst the cacophony of concurrences, and re-percolation after ''Rapanos'' | work=Virginia Journal of Social Policy and the Law | volume=15 | number=2 | pages=299-354 | ssrn=1017992 | ssrn-access=free}}
* {{cite journal | last1=Bloom | first1=James A. | date=2008 | title=Plurality and precedence: Judicial reasoning, lower courts, and the meaning of ''United States v. Winstar Corp.'' | work=Washington University Law Review | volume=85 | number=6 | pages=1373-1417 | url=https://journals.library.wustl.edu/lawreview/article/6705/galley/23538/view/ <!-- https://journals.library.wustl.edu/lawreview/article/id/6705/ --> | access-date=25 January 2024}}
* {{cite journal | last=Cacace | first=Joseph M. | date=2007 | title=Plurality decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States: A reexamination of the ''Marks'' doctrine after ''Rapanos v. United States'' | work=Suffolk University Law Review | volume=41 | number=1 | pages=97-133 | url=http://suffolklawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/11/Cacace_Note_FINAL.pdf | access-date=25 January 2024}}
* {{cite journal | last=Catalano | first=Andrea | date=2021 | title=The ''Marks'' rule misses the mark: How the Seventh Circuit correctly determined the precedential effect of the Supreme Court's ''June Medical'' plurality | work=Seventh Circuit Review | volume=17 | number=1 | pages=1-41 | url=https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol17/iss1/2/ | access-date=25 January 2024}}
* {{cite journal | last=Clark | first=Rachael | date=2019 | title=Piecing together precedent: Fragmented decisions from the Washington State Supreme Court | work=Washington Law Review | volume=94 | number=4 | pages=1989-2027 | url=https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol94/iss4/9/ | access-date=25 January 2024}}
* {{cite journal | last=Corley | first=Pamela C. | date=2009 | title=Uncertain precedent: Circuit court responses to Supreme Court plurality opinions | journal=American Politics Research | volume=37 | issue=1 | issn=1532-673X | doi=10.1177/1532673X08319951 | pages=30–49}}
* {{cite journal | last1=Corley | first1=Pamela. C. | last2=Sommer | first2=Udi | last3=Steigerwalt | first3=Amy | last4=Ward | first4=Artemus | date=2010 | title=Extreme Dissensus: Explaining Plurality Decisions on the United States Supreme Court | work=Justice System Journal | volume=31 | number=2 | pages=180-200 | doi=10.1080/0098261X.2010.10767964 | ssrn=1433742 | url=https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0029/15869/extreme-dissensus.pdf | access-date=25 January 2024}}
* {{cite journal | last=Craig | first=Robin Kundis | date=2011 | title=Agencies interpreting courts interpreting statutes: The deference conundrum of a divided Supreme Court | work=Emory Law Journal | volume=61 | number=1 | pages=1-68 | ssrn=1760591 | url=https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol61/iss1/1/ | access-date=25 January 2024}}
* {{cite journal | last=Curtis | first=Channing J. | date=2024 | title=Untwisting the ''Marks'' rule and plurality precedent: Affirmances by evenly divided courts and theories of holdings | work=Gonzaga Law Review | volume=59 | number=1 | pages=46-91 <!-- There is confusion in page numbering. The SSRN preprint has slightly different page numbering. While this PDF is the one provided by the publisher, the subsequent published article begins on a different page 91, indicating that there are two different published pages numbered as 91. https://gonzaga.azureedge.net/-/media/Website/Documents/Academics/School-of-Law/About/Student-Resources/Student-Organizations/Law-Review/Riesmeyer-Ready-for-Publication.ashx --> | doi=10.2139/ssrn.4383792 | url=https://gonzaga.azureedge.net/-/media/Website/Documents/Academics/School-of-Law/About/Student-Resources/Student-Organizations/Law-Review/Curtis-Ready-for-Publication.ashx <!-- as linked from https://www.gonzaga.edu/school-of-law/about/student-life/student-resources/student-organizations/gonzaga-law-review --> | access-date=25 January 2024}}
* {{cite journal | last1=Davis | first1=John F. | last2=Reynolds | first2=William L. | date=1974 | title=Juridical cripples: Plurality opinions in the supreme court | work=Duke Law Journal | pages=59-86 | jstor=1371753 | url=https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol23/iss1/2/ | access-date=25 January 2024}}
* {{cite journal | last=Davisson | first=Ben | date=2020 | title=Exodus from the land of confusion: Why ''Hughes v. United States'' supports the overruling of the unworkable ''Marks'' doctrine and a change in court practice | work=St. Louis University Law Journal | volume=65 | number=1 | pages=227-250 | url=https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol65/iss1/10/}}
* {{cite journal | last=Denno | first=Deborah W. | date=2014 | title=Lethal injection chaos post-''Baze'' | work=Georgetown Law Journal | volume=102 | number=5 | pages=1331-1382 | ssrn=2328407 | url=https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/506/ | access-date=25 January 2024}}
* {{cite journal | last=Eber | first=Michael L. | date=2008 | title=When the dissent creates the law: Cross-cutting majorities and the prediction model of precedent | work=Emory Law Journal | volume=58 | number=1 | pages=207-248 | ssrn=1116306}}
* {{cite journal | last=Hochschild | first=Adam S. | date=2000 | title=The modern problem of Supreme Court plurality decision: Interpretation in historical perspective | work=Washington University Journal of Law & Policy | volume=4 | number=1 | pages=261-287 | url=https://journals.library.wustl.edu/lawpolicy/article/1680/galley/18514/view/ <!-- https://journals.library.wustl.edu/lawpolicy/article/id/1680/ --> | access-date=25 January 2024}}
* {{cite journal | last=Kazakes | first=Andrew J. | date=2011 | title=Relatively unguided: Examining the precedential value of the plurality decision in ''Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.'', and its effects on class action litigation | work=Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review | volume=44 | number=3 | pages=1049-1071 | url=https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol44/iss3/6/ | access-date=25 January 2024}}
* {{cite journal | last=Kimura | first=Ken | date=1992 | title=Legitimacy model for the interpretation of plurality decisions | work=Cornell Law Review | volume=77 | number=6 | pages=1593-1627 | url=https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol77/iss6/11/ | access-date=25 January 2024}}
* {{cite journal | last=L'Heureux-Dube | first=Claire | date=1990 | title=The length and plurality of Supreme Court of Canada decisions | journal=Alberta Law Review | volume=28 | number=3 | issn=1925-8356 | doi=10.29173/alr1589 | page=581-588}}
* {{cite journal | last=Ledebur | first=Linas E. | date=2008 | title=Plurality rule: Concurring opinions and a divided Supreme Court | work=Penn State Law Review | volume=113 | number=3 | pages=899-921 | url=https://pennstatelawreview.org/articles/113%20Penn%20St.%20L.%20Rev.%20899.pdf | access-date=25 January 2024}}
* {{cite journal | last=Marceau | first=Justin F. | date=2009 | title=Lifting the Haze of Baze: Lethal injection, the Eighth Amendment, and plurality opinions | work=Arizona State Law Journal | volume=41 | pages=159ff. | ssrn=1367203}}
* {{cite journal | last=Marceau | first=Justin F. | date=2013 | title=Plurality decisions: Upward flowing precedent and acoustic separation | work=Connecticut Law Review | volume=45 | number=3 | pages=933-994. | ssrn=2160000 | url=https://digitalcommons.lib.uconn.edu/law_review/189/ | access-date=25 January 2024}}
* {{cite journal | last=McCauley | first=Sean | date=2017 | title=Revising the ''Marks'' rule in light of a plurality prone Supreme Court: A case study of ''National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius'' | work=Boston University Public Interest Law Journal | volume=26 | pages=257ff.}}
* {{cite journal | last=Neuenkirchen | first=John P. | date=2013 | title=Plurality decisions, implicit consensuses, and the fifth-vote rule under ''Marks v. United States'' | work=Widener Law Review | volume=19 | pages=387-440 | url=https://widenerlawreview.org/files/2014/09/05_Neuenkirchen1.pdf | access-date=25 January 2024}}
* {{cite journal | last=Novak | first=Linda | date=1980 | title=The precedential value of Supreme Court plurality decisions | work=Columbia Law Review | volume=80 | number=4 | pages=756-781 | jstor=1122139}}
* {{cite magazine | last=Pfander | first=James E. | title=Making sense of plurality decisions | work=Jotwell: The Journal of Things We Like | date=2 November 2015 | url=http://courtslaw.jotwell.com/making-sense-of-plurality-decisions/ | access-date=25 January 2024}}
* {{cite journal | title=Plurality decisions and judicial decisionmaking | journal=Harvard Law Review | volume=94 | issue=5 | date=March 1981 | doi=10.2307/1340692 | page=1127-1147 | ref={{sfnref | Harvard Law Review | 1981}}}}
* {{cite journal | date=2019 | title=Plurality decisions — The ''Marks'' rule — Fourth Circuit declines to apply Justice White's concurrence in ''Powell v. Texas'' as Binding Precedent. — ''Manning v. Caldwell'', 900 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 2018) | work=Harvard Law Review | volume=132 | number=3 | pages=1089–1095 | jstor=26799678}}
* {{cite journal | last=Rivero | first=Albert H. | last2=Key | first2=Ellen M. | last3=Segal | first3=Jeffrey A. | title=Invisible constitutions: Concurring opinions and plurality judgments under ''Marks v. United States'' | journal=Justice System Journal | volume=43 | issue=3 | date=2022-07-03 | issn=0098-261X | doi=10.1080/0098261X.2022.2095943 | pages=323–338}}
* {{cite journal | last=Spritzer | first=Ralph S. | date=1988 | title=Multiple issue cases and multi member courts: Observations on decision making by discordant minorities | work=Jurimetrics | volume=28 | number=2 | pages=139–146 | jstor=29762059}}
* {{cite journal | last=Stearns | first=Maxwell L. | date=2000 | title=The Case for Including ''Marks v. United States'' in the canon of constitutional law | work=Constitutional commentary | volume=17 | number=2 | pages=321-339 | url=https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/fac_pubs/552/ | access-date=25 January 2024}}
* {{cite journal | last=Steinman | first=Adam | date=23 March 2018 | title=Nonmajority opinions and biconditional rules | work=The Yale Law Journal Forum | volume=128 | url=https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/nonmajority-opinions-biconditional-rules | access-date=25 January 2024 | ssrn=3123807}}
* {{cite journal | last=Stras | first=David R. | last2=Spriggs | first2=James F, II | date=2011 | title=Explaining plurality decisions | work=Georgetown Law Journal | volume=99 | pages=10-11 | ssrn=1562737 | url=http://georgetownlawjournal.org/files/pdf/99-2/StrasSpriggs.pdf | url-status=dead | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110914134410id_/http://georgetownlawjournal.org/files/pdf/99-2/StrasSpriggs.pdf | archive-date=2011-09-14}}
* Sung, Christopher. (2014). How should lower courts interpret plurality decisions?: Exploring options through ''United States v. Duvall''. Calif. L. Rev. Circuit, 5, 249.
* {{cite journal | last=Thigpen | first=Helen | date=2007 | title=The plurality paradox: ''Rapanos v. US'' and the uncertain future of federal wetlands protection | work=Public Land & Resources Law Review | volume=28 | number=1 | pages=89-115 | url=https://scholarworks.umt.edu/plrlr/vol28/iss1/7/ | access-date=25 January 2024}}
* {{cite journal | last=Thurmon | first=Mark Alan | date=1992 | title=When the court divides: Reconsidering the precedential value of Supreme Court plurality decisions | work=Duke Law Journal | volume=42 | number=2 | pages=419-468 | url=https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3205&context=dlj | access-date=25 January 2024}}
* {{cite journal | last=Varsava | first=Nina | date=2019 | title=The role of dissents in the formation of precedent | work=Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy | volume=14 | number=1 | pages=285-343 | ssrn=3094016 | url=https://djclpp.law.duke.edu/article/the-role-of-dissents-in-the-formation-of-precedent-varsava-vol14-iss1/ | access-date=25 January 2024}}
* {{cite journal | last=Varon | first=Jennifer R. | date=2013 | title=A powerless plurality: The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in ''US v. James'' correctly determined that the plurality opinion in ''Williams v. Illinois'' lacks precedential value | work=Creighton Law Review | volume=47 | pages=193-217 | hdl=10504/136807 | hdl-access=free}}
* {{cite journal | last=Weins | first=W. Jesse | date=2011 | title=A problematic plurality precedent: Why the Supreme Court should leave ''Marks'' over ''Van Orden v. Perry'' | work=Nebraska Law Review | volume=85 | number=3 | pages=830-874 | url=https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol85/iss3/7/ | access-date=25 January 2024}}
* {{cite journal | last=West | first=Sonja R. | date=2006 | title=Concurring in part & concurring in the confusion | work=Michigan Law Review | volume=104 | number=8 | pages=1951-1960 | jstor=40041453 | ssrn=804325 | url=https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol104/iss8/2/ | access-date=25 January 2024}}
* {{cite journal | last=Williams | first=Ryan C. | date=2017 | title=Questioning ''Marks'': Plurality decisions and precedential constraint | work=Stanford Law Review | volume=69 | number=3 | pages=795-865 | ssrn=2798738 | url=https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2017/02/69-Stan-L-Rev-795.pdf | access-date=25 January 2024}}
* {{cite journal | last=Williams | first=Ryan C. | date=2021 | title=Plurality decisions and the ambiguity of precedential authority | work=Florida Law Review | volume=74 | pages=1-62 | ssrn=3816564 | url=https://dashboard.lira.bc.edu/downloads/cc6a646b-1043-4dcf-8e70-43a4ae4209f3 | access-date=25 January 2024}}
* {{cite journal | last=Williams | first=Ryan C. | date=2022 | title=Plurality decisions and prior precedent | work=The Federal Courts Law Review | volume=14 | pages=75-105 | url=https://www.fclr.org/content/uploads/2022/06/Williams_Final.pdf | access-date=25 January 2024}}
{{refend}}
 
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[[Category:Legal terminology]]
 
 
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