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The '''''Summa Theologiae''''' or '''''Summa Theologica''''' ({{Translation|'Summary of Theology'}}), often referred to simply as the '''''Summa''''', is the best-known work of [[Thomas Aquinas]] (1225–1274), a [[scholasticism|scholastic]] theologian and [[Doctor of the Church]]. It is a [[compendium]] of all of the main [[theology|theological]] teachings of the [[Catholic Church]], intended to be an instructional guide for theology students, including [[Seminary|seminarians]] and the literate [[laity]]. Presenting the reasoning for almost all points of [[Christian theology]] in the West, topics of the ''Summa'' follow the following cycle: [[God]]; Creation, Man; [[teleology|Man's purpose]]; [[Christ]]; the [[Sacraments]]; and back to God.
 
[[Thomas Aquinas#Late career and cessation of writing (1272–1274)|Although unfinished]], it is "one of the classics of the history of philosophy and one of the most influential works of Western literature."<ref>Ross, James F. 2003. "Thomas Aquinas, 'Summa theologiae' (ca. 1273), Christian Wisdom Explained Philosophically." P. 165 in ''[https://books.google.ca/books?id=6jAcwGItzssC&pg=PA165&redir_esc=y The Classics of Western Philosophy: A Reader's Guide],'' edited by [[Jorge J. E. Gracia|J. J. E. Gracia]], G. M. Reichberg, B. N. Schumacher. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. {{ISBN|9780631236115}}.</ref> Moreover, the ''Summa''It remains Aquinas' "most perfect work, the fruit of his mature years, in which the thought of his whole life is condensed.".<ref>Perrier, Joseph Louis. 1909. "The Revival of Scholastic Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century." New York: [[Columbia University Press]]. pg. 149.</ref> Among non-scholars, the ''Summa'' is perhaps most famous for its five arguments for the existence of God, which are known as the "[[Five Ways (Aquinas)|five ways]]" ({{lang-la|quinque viae}}). The five ways, however, occupy only one of the ''Summa''{{'s}} 3,125 articles.
 
Throughout the ''Summa,'' Aquinas cites [[Christianity|Christian]], [[Islam|Muslim]], [[Judaism|Hebrew]], and [[Paganism|Pagan]] sources, including, but not limited to: [[Catholic Bible|Christian Sacred Scripture]], [[Aristotle]], [[Augustine of Hippo]], [[Avicenna]], [[Averroes]], [[Al-Ghazali]], [[Boethius]], [[John of Damascus]], [[Paul the Apostle]], [[Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite|Pseudo-Dionysius]], [[Maimonides]], [[Anselm of Canterbury]], [[Plato]], [[Cicero]], and [[John Scotus Eriugena]].
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* '''The Jurist''' or '''The Legal Expert''' (''iurisperitus'') – [[Ulpian]] (a [[Roman law|Roman jurist]]): the most-quoted contributor to the [[Pandects]].
* '''Tully''' – [[Cicero|Marcus Tullius Cicero]]: famed Roman statesman and orator who was also responsible for bringing significant swathes of Greek philosophy to Latin-speaking audiences, though generally through summation and commentary in his own work rather than by translation.
* '''Dionysius''' – [[Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite]]: Aquinas refers to the works of Dionysius, whom scholars of the time thought to be the person mentioned in Acts 17:34 (a disciple of [[Paul of Tarsus|St. Paul]]). However, theyThese were most likely written in Syria during the 6th century by a writer who attributed his book to Dionysius (hence the addition of the prefix "pseudo-" to the name "Dionysius" in most modern references to these works).
* '''[[Avicenna]]''' – Aquinas frequently cites this Persian [[polymath]], the Aristotelian/[[Neoplatonism|Neoplatonic]]/[[Early Islamic philosophy|Islamic philosopher]] Ibn Sina ([[Avicenna]]).
* '''[[Al-Ghazali|Al-Ghazel]]''' – Aquinas also cites the [[Kalam|Islamic theologian]] al-Ghazali (Algazel).
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Aquinas develops this line of thought more fully in a shorter work, ''De ente et essentia''.</ref>
* Human reasoning alone can prove: the [[existence of God]]; [[divine simplicity|His total simplicity]] or lack of composition; his [[God and eternity|eternal nature]] (i.e., He exists outside of time, as time is held to be a part of God's created universe); His knowledge; the way His [[Will of God|will]] operates; and His power. However, althoughAlthough St. Thomas felt that human reason alone could prove that God created the universe, reason alone could not determine whether the universe was eternal or actually began at some point in time. Rather, only [[Revelation|divine revelation]] from the [[Book of Genesis]] proves that.<ref group="lower-roman">{{Bibleverse|Romans|1:19-20}}</ref><ref group="lower-roman">[http://www.ccel.org/a/aquinas/summa/FP/FP002.html#FPQ2A2THEP1 ''Summa Theologica'', Pt. I, Q. 2, Art. 2]. See also: Pt. I, Q. 1, Art. 8.</ref>
* All statements about God are either [[Analogy|analogical]] or [[metaphor]]ical: one cannot say man is "good" in exactly the same sense as God, but rather that he imitates in some way the simple nature of God in being good, just, or wise.<ref group="lower-roman">[http://www.ccel.org/a/aquinas/summa/FP/FP004.html#FPQ4A3THEP1 ''Summa Theologica'', Pt. I, Q. 4, Art. 3].</ref>
* 'Unbelief' is the worst [[sin]] in the realm of morals.<ref group="lower-roman">[http://www.ccel.org/a/aquinas/summa/SS/SS010.html#SSQ10A3THEP1 ''Summa Theologica'', Pt. II-II, Q. 10, Art. 3]. Retrieved 11 July 2006.
 
However, atAt other points, Aquinas, with different meanings of "great" makes the claimclaims for pride, despair, and hatred of God.</ref>
* The principles of [[just war]]<ref group="lower-roman">[http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3040.htm ''Summa Theologica'', Pt. II-II, Q. 40].</ref> and [[natural law]]<ref group="lower-roman">[http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2091.htm#2 ''Summa Theologica'', Pt. I-II, Q. 91, Art. 2]; and
 
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Part I treats of God, who is the "[[first cause]], himself uncaused" (''[[primum movens]] immobile'') and as such existent only in act (''actu'')—i.e. pure actuality without potentiality, and therefore without corporeality. His essence is ''[[Actus Purus|actus purus et perfectus]]''. This [[Logical consequence|follows from]] the fivefold proof for the existence of God; namely, there must be a first mover, unmoved, a first cause in the chain of causes, an absolutely necessary being, an absolutely perfect being, and a rational designer. In this connection the thoughts of the unity, [[infinity]], unchangeability, and goodness of the highest being are deduced.
 
As God rules in the world, the "plan of the order of things" preexists in him; in other words, his [[Divine providence|providence]] and the exercise of it in his government are what condition as cause everything which comes to pass in the world. Hence follows [[predestination]]: from eternity some are destined to eternal life, while as concerns others "he permits some to fall short of that end". [[Reprobation]], however, is more than mere foreknowledge; it is the "will of permitting anyone to fall into sin and incur the penalty of condemnation for sin".
 
The effect of predestination is grace. Since God is the first cause of everything, he is the cause of even the free acts of men through predestination. Determinism is deeply grounded in the system of St. Thomas; things (with their source of becoming in God) are ordered from eternity as means for the realization of his end in himself.
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On moral grounds, St. Thomas advocates freedom energetically; but, with his premises, he can have in mind only the psychological form of self-motivation. Nothing in the world is accidental or free, although it may appear so in reference to the proximate cause. From this point of view, miracles become necessary in themselves and are to be considered merely as inexplicable to man. From the point of view of the first cause, all is unchangeable, although from the limited point of view of the secondary cause, miracles may be spoken of.
 
In his doctrine of the [[Trinity]], Aquinas starts from the Augustinian system. Since God has only the functions of thinking and willing, only two ''processiones'' can be asserted from the Father; but these establish definite relations of the persons of the Trinity, one to another. The relations must be conceived as real and not as merely ideal; for, as with creatures relations arise through certain accidents, since in God there is no accident but all is substance, it follows that "the relation really existing in God is the same as the essence according to the thing". From another side, however, the relations as real must be really distinguished one from another. Therefore, three persons are to be affirmed in God.
 
Man stands opposite to God; he consists of [[soul]] and body. The "intellectual soul" consists of [[nous|intellect]] and [[Will (philosophy)|will]]. Furthermore, the soul is the absolutely indivisible form of man; it is immaterial substance, but not one and the same in all men (as the [[Averroism|Averroists]] assumed). The soul's power of knowing has two sides: a passive (the ''[[passive intellect|intellectus possibilis]]'') and an active (the ''intellectus agens'').
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The second part of the ''Summa'' follows this complex of ideas. Its theme is man's striving for the highest end, which is the blessedness of the ''visio beata''. Here, St. Thomas develops his system of ethics, which has its root in [[Aristotle]].
 
In a chain of acts of will, man strives for the highest end. They are free acts, insofar as man has in himself the knowledge of their end (and therein the principle of action). In that the will wills the end, it wills also the appropriate means, chooses freely and completes the ''consensus''. Whether the act is good or evil depends on the end. The "human reason" pronounces judgment concerning the character of the end; it is, therefore, the law for action. Human acts, however, are meritorious insofar as they promote the purpose of God and his honor.
 
==== Sin ====
By repeating a good action, man acquires a moral habit or a quality that enables him to do the good gladly and easily. This is true, however, only of the intellectual and moral virtues (which St. Thomas treats after the manner of [[Aristotle]]); the theological virtues are imparted by God to man as a "disposition", from which the acts here proceed; while they strengthen, they do not form it. The "disposition" of evil is the opposite alternative.
 
An act becomes evil through deviation from the reason and from divine moral law. Therefore, sin involves two factors:
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# its form is deviation from the divine law.
 
[[Sin]] has its origin in the will, which decides (against reason) for a "changeable good". Since, however, the will also moves the other powers of man, sin has its seat in these too. By choosing such a lower good as its end, the will is misled by self-love, so that this works as cause in every sin. God is not the cause of sin since, on the contrary, he draws all things to himself; but from another side, God is the cause of all things, so he is efficacious also in sin as ''actio'' but not as ''ens.'' The devil is not directly the cause of sin, but he incites the imagination and the sensuous impulse of man (as men or things may also do).
 
Sin is [[original sin]]. Adam's first sin passes through himself to all the succeeding race; because he is the head of the human race and "by virtue of procreation human nature is transmitted and along with nature its infection." The powers of generation are, therefore, designated especially as "infected". The thought is involved here by the fact that St. Thomas, like other scholastics, believed in [[creationism]]; he therefore taught that souls are created by God.
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==== Grace ====
The divine law consists of an old and a new. Insofar as the old divine law contains the moral law of nature, it is universally valid; what there is in it, however, beyond this is only valid only for the Jews. The new law is "primarily grace itself" and so a "law given within"; "a gift superadded to nature by grace", but not a "written law". In this sense, as sacramental grace, the new law justifies. It contains, however, an "ordering" of external and internal conduct and so regarded is, as a matter of course, identical with both the old law and the law of nature. The ''consilia ''show how one may attain the end "better and more expediently" by full renunciation of worldly goods.
 
Since man is sinner and creature, he needs grace to reach the final end. The "first cause" alone is able to reclaim him to the "final end". This is true after the fall, although it was needful before. Grace is, on one side, "the free act of God", and, on the other side, the effect of this act, the ''gratia infusa'' or ''gratia creata,'' a ''habitus infusus'' that is instilled into the "essence of the soul... a certain gift of disposition, something supernatural proceeding from God into man." Grace is a supernatural ethical character created in man by God, which comprises in itself all good, both faith and love.
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Inasmuch as this truth that is to be known is practical, it first incites the will, which then brings the reason to "assent"; but since, furthermore, the good in question is transcendent and inaccessible to man by himself, it requires the infusion of a supernatural "capacity" or "disposition" to make man capable of faith as well as love.
 
Accordingly, the object of both faith and love is God, involving also the entire complex of truths and commandments that God reveals, insofar as they in fact relate to God and lead to him. Thus, faith becomes recognition of the teachings and precepts of the Scriptures and the Church ("the first subjection of man to God is by faith"). The object of faith, however, is, by its nature, object of love; therefore, faith comes to completion only in love ("by love is the act of faith accomplished and formed").
 
==== Law ====
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The way which leads to God is [[Christ]], the theme of Part III. It can be asserted that the [[incarnation (Christianity)|incarnation]] was absolutely necessary. The ''Unio'' between the [[Logos (Christianity)|Logos]] and the human nature is a "relation" between the divine and the human nature, which comes about by both natures being brought together in the one person of the Logos. An incarnation can be spoken of only in the sense that the human nature began to be in the eternal hypostasis of the divine nature. So Christ is ''unum'' since his human nature lacks the [[Hypostasis (philosophy and religion)|hypostasis]].
 
The person of the Logos, accordingly, has assumed the impersonal human nature, and in such way that the assumption of the soul became the means for the assumption of the body. This union with the human soul is the ''gratia unionis'', which leads to the impartation of the ''gratia habitualis'' from the Logos to the human nature. Thereby, all human potentialities are made perfect in Jesus. Besides the perfections given by the vision of God, which Jesus enjoyed from the beginning, he receives all others by the ''gratia habitualis''. Insofar, however, as it is the limited human nature which receives these perfections, they are finite. This holds both of the knowledge and the will of Christ.
 
The Logos impresses the ''species intelligibiles'' of all created things on the soul, but the ''[[active intellect|intellectus agens]]'' transforms them gradually into the impressions of sense. On another side, the soul of Christ works miracles only as instrument of the Logos, since omnipotence in no way appertains to this human soul in itself. Concerning redemption, St. Thomas teaches that Christ is to be regarded as redeemer after his human nature but in such way that the human nature produces divine effects as organ of divinity.
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The one side of the work of redemption consists herein, that Christ as head of humanity imparts ''ordo'', ''perfectio'', and ''virtus'' to his members. He is the teacher and example of humanity; his whole life and suffering as well as his work after he is exalted serve this end. The love wrought hereby in men effects, according to Luke vii. 47, the forgiveness of sins.
 
This is the first course of thought. Then follows a second complex of thoughts, which has the idea of satisfaction as its center. To be sure, God as the highest being could forgive sins without satisfaction; but because his justice and mercy could be best revealed through satisfaction, he chose this way. As little, however, as satisfaction is necessary in itself, so little does it offer an equivalent, in a correct sense, for guilt; it is rather a "superabundant satisfaction", since on account of the divine subject in Christ in a certain sense his suffering and activity are infinite.
 
With this thought, the strict logical deduction of [[Anselm of Canterbury|Anselm's]] theory is given up. Christ's suffering bore personal character in that it proceeded "out of love and obedience". It was an offering brought to God, which as a personal act had the character of merit. Thereby, Christ "merited" salvation for men. As Christ, exalted, still influences men, so does he still work on their behalf continually in heaven through the intercession (''interpellatio'').
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The most accessible English translation of the work is that originally published by Benziger Brothers, in five volumes, in 1911 (with a revised edition published in 1920).
 
The translation is entirely the work of Laurence Shapcote (1864-1947), an English Dominican friar. Wanting to remain anonymous, however, he attributed the translation to the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Father Shapcote also translated various of Aquinas's other works.<ref>"Thomas Aquinas's 'Summa Theologiae': A Guide and Commentary" by Brian Davies [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. xiv].
From 1917 until his death, Shapcote was based in [[Natal Province]], [[Union of South Africa|South Africa]]. Fergus Kerr, "The Shapcote Translation", ''New Blackfriars'' (August 2011), {{doi|10.1111/j.1741-2005.2011.01454.x}}.
</ref>